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 During the 1990, a new and promising
measurement method for the long-term
sustainability of public finances was
developed and put to use by economists,
governments and international organisations.
This measure was, of course, based on
generational accounting. A generational
account is the net present value of expected
current and future taxes paid and transfers
received over the rest of life by a representative
individual of a given age and sex. The sum of
generational accounts for all current and
future individuals forms part of the govern-
ment intertemporal budget constraint,
together with the net present value of other
government expenditure and government
debt (or wealth). If there is balance between
revenues, expenditure and debt, then current
tax structure may be sustained for the future.
If the debt is too large, future generations will
have to pay higher net taxes through rising
taxes or lower transfers.
The recent literature on generational
accounting comprises Auerbach, Kotlikoff and
Leibfritz (1999), a collection of applied papers
on generational accounts in 27 countries
around the globe. In another important presen-
tation, EU (1999) includes studies for 12 of the
EU-countries based upon a common frame-
work. An earlier comparative study is OECD
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On February 23, 2001 a workshop on «Generational Accounting in the Nordic Countries»
was held in Reykjavik, Iceland, arranged jointly by the Institute of Economic Studies at the
University of Iceland and the Ministry of Finance in Norway. This paper describes the
main ideas in generational accounting, and gives an overview of results from the papers
presented in the workshop. Finally, it sums up some important lessons and remaining
challenges in generational accounting and for the sustainability of fiscal policy.  JEL
Classification: E6, H4, H6(1995). These studies present and extend the
basic methodology and present a quite diverse
spectrum of results and challenges for more
than 30 countries. Still, the Nordic countries
are not all represented in these presentations. 
In February 2001, a workshop was
organised by the Institute of Economic
Studies at the University of Iceland and the
Ministry of Finance in Norway. The aim of
this workshop was to give an overview of
results from Generational Accounting in the
Nordic countries, to discuss special items
related to each country, and to present views
on the use of generational accounts.
Furthermore, the aim of the workshop was to
identify common problems related to
generational accounts and to discuss some
potential solutions. There were an
international overview presentation, and
separate presentations from Denmark,
Finland, Iceland and Norway. Among the
participants from outside the Nordic
countries were representatives of the OECD,
the US Government Accounting Office, the
German Bundesbank and Freiburg Uni-
versity, and Birkbeck College in London,
UK.1 Some of the papers that were presented
at this workshop are included in this issue. 
An overview of generational
accounting
In the short term, sustainable public finances
are usually about restraining debt and deficits
while allowing room for fiscal stabilisation.
In the longer term, objectives are less clear. In
a recent OECD publication (OECD, 1999)
it is pointed out that among 28 member
countries, only four has a regular report on
the long term outlook (10-40 years) for public
finances. Issues of sustainability have thus
usually been addressed in terms of the effects
of public debt on the economy. 
A reason for this short-sightedness in fiscal
policy is of course that the uncertainty sur-
rounding future revenues and expenditure is
large, and that projections are notoriously
unreliable. The use of numerical economic
models in policy formulation is not well
established in most countries. The views on
such applications is rather negative (i.e., in
CBS (1995) where the role of long term
projections in budget analysis is somewhat
surprisingly rejected). Still, modelling
techniques and the databases have never been
as good as today. 
In addition, in recent years the future
implications of current budgetary policies
have climbed on the agenda as the combined
effects of growing public sectors and
unfavourable demographic trends on the
expected future tax burdens have become
clearer. A number of objections to measuring
the long-term sustainability and the
intergenerational stance of fiscal policy by
looking at annual public budget figures can
be raised. Such figures are subject to political
pressure, to obsolete measurement and
accounting principles, and to a range of other
considerations without economic signi-
ficance. Important considerations may be
decided by the label one chooses for specific
public cash flow, not by the real economic
content and implications of that flow.2
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1.  Regretfully, Sweden was not represented. Results for Sweden has been presented in earlier papers, and are in-
cluded in the paper by Raffelhüschen in this volume.
2.  One example is the budgetary treatment of some similar cash flows: if government receives money today against
a promises to pay back a cash flow in the future, how is that handled in the government accounts? If one labels
the first transaction as pension contributions and the second as pension payments, then a payg-system will reg-
ister the first as a tax and not register the later obligation at all until payment is due years hence. If the label isIntroduced by Auerbach, Gokhale and
Kotlikoff in a number of papers in the late
1980s and early 1990s (see e.g. Auerbach,
Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991)), the
methodology of generational accounting has
now brought long term perspectives into fiscal
analyses for a large number of countries.
Formally, the starting point for generational
accounting is the government intertemporal
budget constraint. This identity, expressed in
present values, can be written 
Public wealth + present value of net taxes =
present value of government consumption 
In this identity, net taxes are defined as all
present and future age dependent taxes less
transfers, and government consumption is
defined as all other items in the government
budget except interest on wealth (debt). While
taxes and transfers (both in cash and in kind)
typically are age dependent, government
consumption is a catchall for non-age
dependent items in the public budgets. In the
identity, public wealth is defined as consisting
of current net wealth (or debt, as may be) and
the amount required for the constraint to
confirm to the sign of equality, which may be
called implicit public wealth (or debt). The
implicit wealth expresses the net present value
of the changes in taxes, transfers or other
expenditure that will be necessary in the future
for the Government to fulfil its liabilities. This
wealth may be positive or negative, of course.
The sum of explicit and implicit debt is the
intertemporal public liabilities (IPL) of a given
policy. The intertemporal public liabilities of 
a country are a much more meaningful
expression than current net wealth (debt). 
The sum of expected future net taxes for
each cohort (or generation) measured as net
present values, is the generational account. The
sum of generational accounts for current and
future generations is part of the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint. A basic
assumption in the generational accounting
methodology is that the net present value of
taxes paid over life generally can be established
by extraction information from administra-
tive registers, surveys and other sources. In
those areas where we know that changes will
take place in the future, they can be modelled
explicitly (a typical example is the phasing in
of pension systems). 
As current generations already have paid
and received some of their lifetime taxes and
transfers depending on age, the accounts for
different generations cannot be compared.
The current new-born generation and future
generations are the only ones with full and
comparable generational accounts. In the first
papers the budget identity were balanced by
increasing the present value of net taxes on
future generations with an amount equal to
the intertemporal public liabilities. The ratio
of the accounts of new-born to accounts of
net yet born children thus expressed how
much higher tax burdens future generations
would have to face under the present
budgetary policy (e.g., Auerbach et al., 1993).
Still, when the denominator approaches zero
or if the denominator and numerator have
opposite signs, the interpretation of the ratio
between current and future new-born
generations’ accounts meets with obvious
problems. Also, an interpretation of higher or
lower net taxes for future generations is that
concurrent generations in the future may face
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changed so that the first transaction is to raise a loan and the second to pay back the instalments, then the treat-
ment in the government account is completely different, especially with regard to including the capital item
(the loan). There is no economic rationale for treating identical cash flows differently just because of the chosen
label.different tax schedules during the same period
of time. 
In the growing literature on generational
accounting, several other options and
concepts for solving the intertemporal
budget identity have been introduced.
Raffelhüschen (1999) points out that the
generational imbalance is derived from the
intertemporal public liabilities within the
government’s intertemporal budget
requirement, and prefers this measure. The
intertemporal public liabilities may also be
transformed into a flow measure, by relating
it to a permanent reduction (or possibly an
increase) with the same net present value in
one of the items on the budget. All genera-
tions would then face this reduction
(increase). Potential measures include the
required reduction in all or some age-
dependent transfers, the required increase in
all or some age-dependent taxes, or the
required reduction in government consump-
tion. The first two alternatives are typically
hard to reconcile with change - e.g. because
of the progressive structure of income taxes,
increased revenues from changes in taxation
rules will usually imply changes in the age-
and sex profile of that tax as well. As transfers
typically have a degressive structure, the same
argument with an opposite sign may apply.
This is of course because changes are marginal
while the typical age- and sex-profiles of taxes
and transfers used in generational accounting
expresses averages. An alternative is the
required reduction in general government
consumption to restore balance between
generations. This variable can be related
directly to the budget surplus (deficit).3
In the paper by Raffelhüschen in the
present volume, a more detailed presentation
of the generational accounting methodology
is included. 
Generational Accounting in the
Nordic countries
While in general terms rather similar nations,
the Nordic countries still differ markedly in
economic fundamentals and how the public
sector is organised. For all of these countries,
generational accounts have been produced,
and for some of the countries such accounts
have been presented several times already. The
presentations at the workshop were all
updated with regard to former results. 
For Finland, generational accounts have
been presented on several occasions. The first
presentations coincided with the major
downturn in the Finnish economy triggered
by the breakdown in the COMECON
countries. As public budgets were strongly
affected, the generational balance based on
1995 budget figures was heavily in favour of
current generations. Updated results in the
paper by Vanne now show that the recent high
growth rates that Finland has experienced
both in the economy and in the asset markets
have translated into a much stronger
generational stance. In fact, based upon
current budgets and existing public wealth,
future generations will face lower relative net
tax burdens over their lifetimes than current
new-borns. 
In the national accounts, pension assets in
the Finnish pension funds are included in the
as public wealth. Other assets held by the
Finnish central government, are now approx.
equal to Finland’s gross debt, and the net
explicit wealth of the Finnish public sectors
equals some 64 per cent of GDP in 2000. The
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3.  Based on these arguments, the indicator of the intergenerational fiscal stance that has been used for the pre-
sentations in the Norwegian National Budgets is the required reduction in general government consumption
that is necessary to restore balance between generations (see Gjersem in the present volume).intertemporal public liabilities, as defined in
the discussion of the intertemporal budget
constraint above and calculated for a standard
combination of 5 per cent interest rate and
1.5 per cent growth rate, turns out to be
negative (i.e., implicit wealth) and nearly
equal to GDP for Finland. Translating this
into a flow measure, it leaves room for
reducing taxes by 3.4 per cent of GDP on a
sustained basis and still preserves generational
equality. Calculated for a interest rate of 3 per
cent and long term growth of 1.5 per cent,
the results still indicates that generational
equality is fulfilled in Finland. 
Vanne points out that increasing public
wealth, driven by strong growth in asset
markets, has been the main engine behind the
change in the generational stance from 1995
through 2000. This raises the question of how
to handle uncertain asset prices in generational
accounting. More generally, Vanne worries
that temporary effects from business cycles
and uncertain wealth together may lead to an
excessively rosy picture in such upturns as the
Finnish economy has experienced. 
In the paper on generational equality in
Iceland, Hall and Jóhannsdóttir present
comprehensive generational accounts for this
small, resource-based nation. They show that
the economic boom experienced during the
latter part of the 1990s has resulted in changes
in the public accounts, leading to more
generational equity based on the 1998 fiscal
accounts. Still, by repeating the calculations
back to 1994, the effect of the boom is
striking. The results in 1994 show inter-
temporal public liabilities of 120 per cent of
GDP, while in 1998 the sign has changed at -
16 per cent. These figures are calculated for
growth rate 1.5 per cent and interest rate of 6
per cent. Reducing the interest rate to 4 per
cent lowers the liabilities in 1998 even further,
to -43 per cent. 
The improvements came even though the
explicit debt in 1998 was just below 40 per
cent of GDP, more or less unchanged over the
period. The improvement is solely due to a
fall in expenditure combined with increases
in revenues. Even though some of this
probably is due to temporary business cycle
effects, Hall and Jóhannsdóttir point out that
the structural deficit has turned to a surplus
over the same period. This indicates that the
generational balance should stay stronger than
in 1994, even if business cycle effects turn
negative again. 
Hall and Jóhannsdóttir use the genera-
tional accounting framework to analyse a
current suggestion of reforming the fishing
permit system in Iceland, an important part
og public finances. Based upon introduction
of a fishing permit fee, the intertemporal
public liabilities are reduced, giving budget
room for a further lowering of taxes from
1998. In the analysis, the fishing permit fee is
determined so that the net present value of
the fee is equal to the government’s unfunded
pension liabilities. A lower fee would still
contribute to turning the generational balance
towards the future. 
In the literature on generational
accounting, earlier authors have noted that
their results are quite sensitive to the choice
of interest and growth rates. Hall and
Jóhannsdóttir use Monte Carlo sensitivity
analysis to show how the Icelandic
generational accounts vary according to
changes in these rates. The authors also point
out that an increasing interest rate affects
current and future generations differently, as
the net tax flows faced during a full life crosses
from net taxes to net transfers several times.
Especially, the important factor for the results
is the magnitude of the gap between the
interest rate and growth. For reasonable
magnitudes, the changes in liabilities are
modest. Such analysis illustrates both the
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assumptions influence the results. 
The ambitious Danish paper by Jensen,
Nødgaard and Pedersen addresses the
question of fiscal sustainability by combining
a numerical overlapping generations model
with the generational accounting framework.
This work combines the intuitive appeal of
generational accounts with more rigorous
modelling and the economic feedback
mechanisms in the more complete model. In
Denmark, there is still a generational deficit
in the sense that increased taxation or reduced
transfers are needed to equalise burdens over
time. In the paper, Jensen et al. estimate this
as a permanent income tax rise equal to 3/4
per cent of GDP. 
Under the combined approach, the
authors can discuss the intergenerational
stance in terms of established concepts such
as tax smoothing and social welfare functions.
The authors point out that tax smoothing
should be superior to leaving the inter-
generational imbalance to future generations,
but also that tax smoothing may result in debt
ratios that conflicts with the Growth and
Stability Pact of the EMU members. Hence
they suggest a path where debt ratios are kept
constant; pointing out that this will hurt
current generations. Still, the effects seem to
be rather small in all of these scenarios. To
study the results closer, the authors suggest a
social welfare function, still showing small
effects. Thus, compliance with the Growth
and Stability Pact will only include small
intergenerational costs. 
In oil-rich Norway, public budgets are
currently showing enormous surpluses. The
established view is that petroleum revenues
will fall while pension transfers and other age-
related expenses will rise. Thus, long term
issues are especially important, and genera-
tional accounts have been presented in the
National Budgets since the middle of the
1990s. While the first presentations
(Auerbach et al. (1993)) showed that future
Norwegians would be facing lifetime tax
burdens that could well be twice as large as
those confronting today’s children, continued
updates through the business cycle upturn in
the 1990s now turn out balanced results.
Measured for growth rate 1,5 per cent and
interest rate of 5 per cent, as in EU (1999),
the current intertemporal liabilities are nega-
tive and equal to 26 per cent of GDP.
Reducing the interest rate to 4 per cent and
the growth rate to 1 per cent results in
balancing the accounts and eliminating the
liabilities. Recent developments seem to have
been working towards a new increase in
intertemporal liabilities, though. 
Gjersem points out that the presentations
of generational accounts in Norwegian public
documents have evolved in a number of ways
over time. Especially, the presentations has
been extended to include a correction factor
for the business cycle, based on other
modelling efforts in the Ministry of Finance.
This extension leads to more stable results
over the business cycle. Still, it is quite
disturbing to note that even small changes in
assumptions may alter the results by much, as
shown in the paper by Gjersem. While being
a special result of the Norwegian situation,
where the large public wealth will remain
unaffected by future growth rates while other
income and revenue and thus the primary
balance will change, it may still indicate that
other countries may experience similar
uncertainty. Gjersem points out that for
Norway, this uncertainty should translate into
a necessity to set aside considerable capital
during the current period of high petroleum
revenues to avoid a severe tightening of
general government budgets later on.
As a result of increasing expenditure on
old age and disability pensions while revenues
from petroleum activities decline, it is clear
8 Carl E. Gjersemthat fiscal policy will be facing considerable
challenges in the long term. Gjersem shows
that the economic modelling approach to
government production and purchases of
goods and services is important by illustrating
the effects of the approach based on using
constant shares of GDP per capita for future
purchases, as opposed to modelling purchases
based on constant volumes per capital
combined with price indexing below CPI (as
can be established from history). Both
approaches can be found in recent work, but
they give rather different results. Thus, the
paper points out additional uncertainty in an
area of modelling where growth in
expenditure long and in most countries has
been stronger than predicted. 
Swedish generational accounts have been
presented by Olsson (1995), Hagemann and
John (1999) and also by Lundvik, Lüth and
Raffelhüschen (1999).4Olsson in 1995 found
that future generations’ payments will exceed
the current new-borns’ by far, but that actual
reforms in the taxation and social security
fields combined with a fast recovery to
«normal» levels of unemployment and macro-
economic activity would turn this imbalance
in favour of future generations. These
calculations were obtained using an interest
rate that was one percentage point above the
growth rate. At higher and more realistic
interest rates, they were less favourable for the
future generations. While Olsson pointed out
that the calculations were highly sensitive to
these assumptions, he also used interest and
growth rates in excess of most other authors. 
Represented in the EU-survey published
in 1999, Lundvik et al. report intertemporal
public debt at over two times Sweden’s GDP
in 1995. This is despite the fact that Sweden
has a rather low explicit debt figure. Sweden
thus seems to represent a Scandinavian
welfare state alike Norway but without
petroleum wealth. Still, in 1995 Sweden was
on the way of preparing major tax and pension
reforms in order to adjust to internal EU
settings. In fact, taking into account these
reforms, Sweden would get a much better
position. Moreover, taking the medium-term
budget projections into account, it is pointed
out by Hagemann and John (1999) and by
Raffelhüschen in the present volume, that
Sweden would be very close to the Danish
figures. In the Lundvik et al. study, which
comprised part of a much larger work in EU
(see EU (1999) for a detailed description), no
business cycle adjustment or medium term
budget projection was taken into account.
Thus, combining the to studies it seems now
clear that business cycle effects and other
effects are as important for Sweden as for the
other Nordic countries. 
In the final paper, Raffelhüschen presents
how generational accounting in the Nordic
countries compares to results from a large
number of other countries. This international
comparative study of generational accoun-
ting comprises analyses of fiscal policy in
USA, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and 12
of the EU countries, including Finland,
Sweden and Denmark. As international
comparisons typically are hard to carry out,
as conceptual and methodological issues tend
to confuse issues and results, great care has
been taken to deal with such problems in this
study through a common framework and
broad co-operation between researchers in all
countries. Thus, the comparison is based on
1995 as a common base year, and as far as
possible on common assumptions on other
items. While the assumptions are common,
they may not coincide with the preferred
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4.  Sweden was not represented at the workshop in Reykjavik.assumptions in each of the countries. The
paper ranks the countries according to the
intertemporal public liabilities, placing
Ireland and Norway on the top and Sweden
and Finland at the bottom. Denmark and
Iceland fall in the middle. Compared to the
papers in the current volume, developments
in fiscal policy in some of these countries since
1995 may seem to have influenced the
ranking.
The paper shows that demographic
developments will put social transfer systems
in most of these countries under pressure, and
high debt ratios are already calling the
sustainability of present fiscal policy into
question. Some parts of current policy will
obviously come under pressure as time goes
by. An example is that countries that has opted
for price indexing in their transfer system are
formally in a better position than countries
that practise wage indexing, but also that such
policies will be hard to follow as the distance
between wage earners and recipients of
transfers, such as pensions, increases. The
paper shows that developing cross-country
comparisons of the sustainability of fiscal
policy is feasible, and also how different
approaches may and will affect the
calculations and thus the intergenerational
stance of a country’s policy. 
Remaining challenges
In most industrialised countries, issues
concerning sound and sustainable finances
are high on the political agenda. Growing
debt burdens induce rising interest payments
and force politicians to economise on other
spending items. Traditional fiscal indicators
based on cash-flow accounts fail to address
ageing phenomena because future liabilities
of pay-as-you-go retirement and health care
systems are absent from current fiscal flows.
Hence, cash-flow deficits and the size of
outstanding debt are unreliable as indicators
of fiscal sustainability. 
In all the Nordic countries, the results
from the generational accounting methodo-
logy seem to indicate that fiscal policy is in or
rather close to intergenerational balance. Still,
the papers here show that the measurement
of generational accounts is highly sensitive to
temporary business cycle fluctuations. This
should remind both policy makers and experts
that the basic problem of separating business
cycles from growth still remains in all long
term budgeting and planning. Optimistic
projections during upturns and pessimistic
projections in downturns may be found in
public document and projection papers
decades back, and are still a major problem in
all such work. In the papers in this volume
such difficulties are illustrated and some
solutions suggested. Still, only further
research will show whether these methods are
robust over time. 
In Norway, a large part of the strong
current stance stems from oil revenues, some
already obtained these last years but a large
part to be earned in the future. In Finland,
the combination of high asset prices and the
recovery from the fall of the Soviet Union is
the explanation. In Iceland, abundant
resources these last years have improved the
situation enormously. For all countries, the
question of what part of the improvement
that will stay permanent through the next
business cycle is still unanswered. Other
uncertainty related to future public income
and wealth is also important, and hard to
model and present. 
The results are also sensitive to assump-
tions about productivity growth and the
discount rate. This is presented in the
Norwegian study and illustrated further in
the Icelandic paper. It is quite disturbing to
note that even small changes in assumptions
may change the results so much, especially in
10 Carl E. Gjersemthe Norwegian accounts. This situation
means that strong policy recommendations
based on generational accounts alone are not
warranted.
Differences between the Nordic countries
may still be due to the different methodology,
different time horizons and – in some cases –
different policy assumptions and population
projections. Still, generational accounting
seems to offer a practical way of modelling
the public sector in a long-term perspective
and illustrating the effects of different policies
and assumptions. While there are some areas
where uncertainty still exists, these challenges
are the same as can be found in other
modelling approaches. Formal economic
models are needed to analyse the magnitude
of future challenges and the policy changes
needed today. Especially, a combination of
models as shown by Jensen et al. seems to be
a promising approach. Generational
accounting is one of several methods telling
us something about how large the current
surpluses or how small the deficits should be.
Generational accounting points out the
importance of a broad strategy to meet the
future challenges of ageing, aiming to
strengthen the economic fundament for
future welfare by measures to promote a well
functioning economy, high employment and
sound public finances through a tight fiscal
policy. Generational accounting puts together
all items in the general government accounts
with a view to future development through
changing demographics, and thus offers such
an integrated approach. Generational
accounting applied and presented with care
and caution is a valuable tool with intuitive
appeal to the general public, and
supplemented by other models it illustrates
the need for budget discipline now to avoid
hardship on future generations.
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